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Abstract
Each of us has felt afraid, and we can all recognize fear in many animal species. Yet there is no
consensus in the scientific study of fear. Some argue that “fear” is a psychological construct rather
than discoverable through scientific investigation. Others argue that the term “fear” cannot
properly be applied to animals because we cannot know whether they feel afraid. Studies in
rodents show that there are highly specific brain circuits for fear, whereas findings from human
neuroimaging seem to make the opposite claim. Here I review the field and urge three approaches
that could reconcile the debates. For one, we need a broadly comparative approach that would
identify core components of fear conserved across phylogeny. This also pushes us towards the
second point of emphasis: an ecological theory of fear that is essentially functional. Finally, we
should aim even to incorporate the conscious experience of being afraid, reinvigorating the study
of feelings across species.
Introduction
Could you be in a state of fear without feeling afraid? Is fear applicable to species like rats?
What about flies? And how would you know?
Laypeople have no difficulty using the word “fear” in everyday conversation, yet are
quickly stumped by questions such as these. So are psychologists and biologists. Despite an
explosion of recent findings, spurred in large part by funding to help understand mood and
anxiety disorders, the field of emotion research is more fragmented than ever. Much of this
fragmentation, and much of the excitement, comes from the highly interdisciplinary nature
of how fear is being investigated. A flurry of neurobiological data has come from two
technical developments: fMRI (applied to humans) and optogenetics (applied to mice). Yet
findings from these two approaches, together with ecological and psychological work, have
not resulted in the emergence of any consensus on how to operationalize or investigate the
emotion fear. Here I review this field from a broad perspective and suggest an approach to
investigating fear that aims to move beyond the debates, and to reinvigorate studies by
returning to some of the historical roots.
At the outset, we need an operational definition of “fear”. The approach I advocate is
pragmatic: fear is an intervening variable between sets of context-dependent stimuli and
suites of behavioral response. Its usefulness is explanatory, and one can be agnostic about
any correspondence with other psychological, let alone neurobiological, states. Such a
variable could take on a consistent set of values within an individual, and differ
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systematically between individuals, making it a candidate for a personality trait. It could be
linked to variation in genotype, at least in part, making it a candidate for an endophenotype.
Several features of such a concept of “fear” are important to stress. First and foremost, it is a
functional definition: fear is a central state of an organism (Box 1). It is not identified with
the conscious feeling of being afraid, nor with fear behaviors such as screaming and running
away. Both feelings and behavior can of course be used as evidence for a central state of
fear, but the evidence for the state is not the state itself. Instead, fear as a central state is
what causes the conscious experience (in some species and under some conditions) and what
causes the fear behaviors (again, the details depending to some extent on species and
circumstances). Fear in turn is caused by particular sets of stimuli (in a context-dependent
way). Fear is what links sets of stimuli to patterns of behaviors. Unlike with reflexes, this
link in the case of an emotion like fear is much more flexible (hence all the parenthetical
qualifiers in this paragraph) and the state can exist prior to and after the eliciting stimuli
(decoupling the state of fear from the eliciting stimuli, unlike with reflexes).
Specifying the sets of stimuli that normally elicit fear, and the sets of behavioral, autonomic,
endocrine, and cognitive responses caused by fear, is of course a large and complex task. It
is made easier by statistical regularities in the environment, and by phylogenetic continuity.
There are evolved sets of behavioral packages to particular classes of stimuli encountered in
a particular context in the case of rats [1], as in humans [2] (see also Table 3). Ecologists
uncover the packages of behaviors and classes of stimuli as they occur in their natural
environment, psychologists attempt to link their processing to the rest of cognition, and
neuroscientists work on figuring out how the stimuli can be linked to the behaviors by the
brain.
Historical and Current Debates
Theories of emotion have a long and checkered history, and perennial questions remain.
How many emotions are there? What defines an emotion? Are emotions discrete or
dimensional? What is their function? Which are unique to humans? Historically, much of
the work has been done in philosophy and psychology with an almost exclusive focus on
humans. There is debate concerning whether there is a small set of “basic” emotions that
might be universal [3], and alternative accounts have proposed underlying dimensional
frameworks and theories based on the psychological construction of emotions [4–6] (Table
1).
More recently, these debates have been informed by functional neuroimaging, and in
particular by several meta-analyses that have tried to glean patterns of regional brain
activation seen across larger numbers of studies. More than a century ago, the psychologist
William James already envisioned emotions as corresponding to specific
psychophysiological patterns in the body [7], although he recognized that each instance of
an emotion might have a different pattern. Indeed, finding reliable psychophysiological
patterns that would classify emotion categories (e.g., happiness vs. sadness) is an idea for
which there has been little empirical support. Nowadays this picture has been transposed
into the brain, and the debate remains alive: are there specific brain systems for happiness,
for fear, for anger, for sadness? These emotions and others like them all seem distinct in
terms of how we experience them, so one naturally wonders whether there are
correspondingly distinct neural systems that generate them. Yet whereas some meta-
analyses have found distinct patterns of brain activation corresponding to different basic
emotions [8, 9], others have claimed that simpler or more abstract dimensional frameworks
provide a better description of the data, or that the emotions we normally categorize simply
do not have corresponding distinct patterns of activation in the brain at all [10, 11] (Figure
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1). These neurobiological results, together with psychological studies, have kept alive
arguments about whether there are basic emotions like fear, whether there are basic
emotions but they are more general or abstract than “fear” [12, 13], or whether emotions
such as fear instead correspond to regions in a broad dimensional space of valence and
arousal, or of reward and punishment [4, 14–16], and might be to a large degree social
constructs in humans [6].
All of this would have seemed rather bizarre to Charles Darwin [17], were he alive to
witness these debates. Aside from utilizing mostly data from fMRI, the debate has also
mostly used data from humans. Yet one of the key points Darwin made regarding emotions
was their phylogenetic continuity: nonhuman primates, rodents, and even invertebrates,
show strong homologues or analogues of several human emotions, both functionally and
behaviorally (perhaps most clearly for aggression, fear, and disgust). Of course, there are
aspects of all emotions that are likely unique to humans (e.g., those aspects dependent on
language); and there well may be varieties of emotions unique to humans (e.g., emotions
such as guilt or awe, although precursors to such emotions can likely be found in other
animals as well). But it would seem that a logical starting point would be to pick an emotion
for which there is good reason to believe in a strong phylogenetic continuity, understand its
neurobiological basis in animal models, and then build on that core emotion scaffold the
elaborations that the human brain provides [18]. There would be no better place to start such
an endeavor than the emotion of fear.
Types of Fear
Some psychological theories propose that fear is a biologically basic emotion of all humans
and many other animals [3], a view in line with most lay opinions as well. But several
proposals beg to differ, arguing that emotions like fear should be replaced by a distinction
between a fear and a panic system [12], or “survival circuits” related more broadly to
adaptive behavior [13], or dimensional accounts such as reward and punishment [15]. A
variety of evidence supports a view also in line with common usage: there are types fear.
The most common distinction is between fear and anxiety. Whereas fear is usually
conceptualized as an adaptive but phasic (transient) state elicited through confrontation with
a threatening stimulus, anxiety is a more tonic state related to prediction and preparedness--
the distinction is similar to the one between emotions versus moods. Some schemes have
related fear and anxiety to dissociable neural structures for mediating their behavioral
effects, for instance the central nucleus of the amygdala (for fear), and the nearby bed
nucleus of the striaterminalis (for anxiety) [19]. However, the dense interconnectivity of
these two structures makes it difficult to uniquely assign either of them to participation in
only one of these processes. A yet finer-grained classification makes distinctions between
anxiety, fear, and panic, three varieties of fear that each are associated with particular
packages of adaptive responses yet can all be mapped also onto a continuum of threat
imminence (respectively, from more distal to more proximal [20]).
There is also evidence for multiple fear circuits in relation to the content of the threat. For
instance, it has been argued that there are separate neural systems for fear of pain, predators,
and aggressive conspecifics [21]. Each of these can be processed through a distinct sensory
channel (e.g., somatosensory, olfactory, visual), engage distinct subnuclei in the amygdala
and hypothalamus, and result in distinct responses mediated by particular parts of the
periaqueductal gray (PAG) (respectively, ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and dorsomedial).
Some of these distinctions among putative fear-subsystems are also supported by distinct
molecular markers. For example, the predator-related subsystem is marked by the expression
of steroidogenic factor 1 across several species, and corticotropin releasing factor is
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expressed across a wide range of species and serves as a marker of the central amygdala in
rodents (see Box 1 in [21]). A recent comparison between humans and mice revealed that
copy number variations at specific genetic loci can influence remarkably specific types of
fear: duplications of the GTF2I gene are associated with increased separation anxiety in both
species [22].
Are these findings of multiple fear systems a problem for a concept of “fear” as a central
state? Of course, partly different sets of individual neurons will no doubt be involved in
processing different fear stimuli, or for that matter even the identical fear stimulus but on
different occasions. This no more shows that there are distinct fear systems than does the
fact that different visual images evoke somewhat different patterns of neural response in
visual parts of the brain: nobody would conclude from this that there are many different
visual systems. To demonstrate distinct fear systems, we would need to be able reliably to
trace processing streams, and we would need to decide on the level of grain at which such
processing streams are implemented in the brain. If we do find more than one such parallel
processing stream for fear, then this could show that there are neurobiologically distinct
types of fear that all share a common ecological theme (they are about threat, but different
types of threat). But unless the number of such parallel systems gets very large, this would
seem like progress in understanding the microstructure of fear, rather than an obstacle to
using the term. In this respect, the data so far would seem to indicate that “fear” is quite a
cohesive concept with likely fewer subtypes than, say, “memory”.
Three Recommendations for the Study of Fear
A functional definition of fear motivates three recommendations that form recurring themes
throughout this review. One is that an investigation, and ultimate functional and
neurobiological understanding, of fear requires a comparative approach: it cannot be
investigated in humans alone. A second, complementary, idea is that understanding fear
requires careful ecological work by biologists observing particular species in their natural
environment in order to describe its functional role. This in turn suggests a need for close
collaboration between psychologists and neuroscientists working in the lab, on the one hand,
and biologists in the field, on the other. A third, more speculative, idea is that a fruitful
purchase on understanding fear may be to investigate how it is experienced (felt) across
species.
The first two recommendations capitalize on Darwin’s original insight about the
phylogenetic continuity of emotional expressions [17] and assume that it will be easier in
many respects to understand fear in rodents, zebrafish, or even invertebrates, than in
humans. A benefit of including animals with simpler brains in this range is that it forces us
towards a concept of a fear state that is more abstract and functional, rather than one tied to
any particular neurobiological implementation or type of conscious experience. Another
reason it is advantageous to investigate fear in nonhuman animals is of course that many
experiments are simply much easier, or only feasible, carried out this way-- ranging from
optogenetic manipulation of precisely defined cell populations, to mapping of gene loci that
contribute to fearfulness. Inducing fear in the laboratory in ecologically valid ways also is
much simpler in animals other than humans (who typically know they are part of an
experiment).
The third recommendation opens the door for a particularly exciting set of future studies. It
not only investigates what the layperson might consider the most important and salient
aspect of fear (how it feels), but also may provide a clever experimental approach for how to
classify the multi-dimensional behavioral and cognitive accompaniments of fear. The basic
idea is that the brains of higher mammals (and perhaps other animals) already do a lot of the
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work for us: they already represent emotional states so as to provide the animal with a more
compact description of its current functional state. Rather than attempting to record and
extract patterns for “fear” from all the varied somatic, visceral, endocrine and cognitive
changes that can accompany an emotion, we might simply look to the interoceptive self-
representations in the brain that map these variables [23, 24]. In humans, their joint
representation provides an important part of the information on the basis of which people
can verbally report that they feel afraid. Of course, there are well-known difficulties with
using verbal report as the sole source of data; the recommendation here is not to rely on
verbal report per se, but to push it back one level to measurement of the neural
representation on which verbal reports are in part based (a measurement that is of course
also available in nonverbal animals, once we know where to look). This third theme goes
hand in hand with current developments in the neurobiology of consciousness, and it may
bring back to the scientific study of emotions a topic that, ever since Behaviorism, has been
excluded (despite the fact that many modern neurobiological views on emotion now mention
it [12, 13, 15, 24, 25]).
Neural Circuits for Fear
Many cortical regions together with midbrain and brainstem nuclei participate in fear
responses, but how they all interact still remains relatively unclear (see [12, 26, 27] and
Figure 5 for some partial schemes). I do not attempt any kind of comprehensive review of
the neurobiological literature here, but outline some of the best studied circuits. It is
important to reiterate that the neurobiology of fear is still in its infancy; there are many
structures that likely play key roles, but about which we know very little. For instance,
subdivisions of the habenula likely contribute to signaling fear-related information to
brainstem nuclei, and provide signals about punishment or absence of reward to reward-
learning systems [28]; parts of this pathway are highly conserved across vertebrates [29].
Stress and anxiety have also been reported to activate the lateral septum [30], although the
precise and causal role of this structure remains rather unclear. None of these structures is
commonly encountered in neurobiological studies of fear in humans.
Of course, the functional role of the participating brain structures depends on specific
neurotransmitters and their receptors. This level of explanation has been informed by the
actions of specific drugs, such as the anxiolytic effects of benzodiazepines. Of some interest
have been drugs acting on serotonin reuptake transporters, a very widely prescribed class of
agents for treating mood and anxiety disorders (such as the drug Prozac). There is some
support for a classic theory of the differential actions of serotonin in facilitating anxiety but
inhibiting panic [31]. Similar attention has also been devoted to another neuromodulator
controlled by specific brainstem neurons: norepinephrine. A distinguishing feature of both
the serotonergic and noradrenergic systems is that a relatively discrete population of neurons
(in the dorsal raphe, and the locus ceruleus, respectively) innervates a wide swath of distal
targets, making possible precisely the kind of global and coordinated effects on information
processing that an emotional state like fear requires.
Perhaps the best understood axis of processing fear in the mammalian brain involves
structures connected with the amygdala (Figures 2,5). At the cortical end, the most
prominent of these is the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex, including cingulate cortex. At
the other end are the hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and many brainstem nuclei
as well as the intermediolateral cell column of the spinal cord and peripheral components of
the autonomic nervous system. It is tempting to view the function of this assembly of
structures in terms of the lower levels implementing emotional responses, and the cortical
levels exerting modulatory control and regulation (see below). While such a view is not
entirely inaccurate, it fails to capture the complexity of how these different structures
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implement fear -- in good part due to massive reciprocal interactions between all the
components. For instance, the amygdala projects to the PAG and conversely. The amygdala
is also reciprocally connected with prefrontal cortex, and concurrent recordings in both
structures clearly show that there is no simple serial processing but a much more complex
iterative flow of information [32]. Two other sets of structures that need to be incorporated
into the scheme are parts of the basal ganglia involved in reward processing and
instrumental behavior, and the insula, involved in interoception.
Fear and the Amygdala
The basolateral amygdala receives most of the sensory inputs that specify fear associations
(with the exception of olfactory input, which comes into the medial nucleus) and selective
optogenetic activation of neurons within this nucleus is sufficient to associate the incoming
sensory information with unconditioned fear responses [33] (Figure 2). The central nucleus
of the amygdala is widely considered the main output regulator for mediating fear responses,
and these are in turn mediated by distinct subdivisions of the central nucleus. Whereas some
of these neurons can inhibit cholinergic targets mediating cortical arousal (in the
substantiainnominata, diagonal band of Broca, nucleus basalis), they can at the same time
promote freezing through projections to the periaqueductal gray [34]. The flexible
modulation of different downstream fear components by the central amygdala depends on an
intricate inhibitory control balance internal to the amygdala [35, 36].
Studies of the amygdala in humans have implicated this structure in the recognition [37],
expression [38], and experience [39] of fear. However, in human neuroimaging studies it is
activated not only in anxiety and phobia [40] but by a broad range of unpleasant or pleasant
stimuli [41–43], including highly arousing appetitive stimuli such as sexual stimuli or one’s
favorite music [44, 45]. The enormous range of stimulus properties that have been reported
to activate the amygdala has given way to views that try to provide a more unified picture.
Such accounts typically acknowledge that the amygdala plays an important role in fear, but
stop short of endorsing the claim that this is a basic function. Instead, they propose that it is
merely one example of a broader and more abstract function, such as processing arousal,
value, preference, relevance, impact, vigilance, surprise, unsigned prediction error,
associability, ambiguity or unpredictability. The extent to which any of these functions are
domain-specific (notably, in regard to processing social stimuli) remains an open question
[46].
Much of this literature has interacted with the amygdala’s well-known role in memory [47]
and attention [48], with the emerging possibility that the amygdala may play a more
modulatory [49], developmental [50], and learning-related role [51], rather than a principal
role in the on-line processing of fear. Somewhat relatedly, there has been a shift towards
more network-based views of fear processing, in which structures such as the amygdala are
nodes in an anatomically much more extended collection of structures [52]. This shift
emphasizes the fact that the initial question was simply ill-posed: “what does the amygdala
do?” is not a sensical query in the first place, because the amygdala in isolation does
nothing; it all depends on the particular network in which it participates. This also points us
towards a different view on the search for neuroimaging activation patterns specific to
certain emotions: the circuits responsible may simply be too distributed to resolve using
techniques such as fMRI.
As important as moving from the amygdala outwards to include it in larger networks is
moving inwards to consider its internal components. Earlier work in rodents began to show
that different amygdala nuclei are involved in different types of fear-related behaviors, such
as innate responses to conditioned stimuli or actions to avoid them (e.g., [53, 54]). However,
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whereas the earlier studies investigated these issues using bulk lesions of tissue (and
generated some conflicting findings), it is now clear that the level of resolution required is at
the level of specific neuronal subpopulations, often intermingled even within a single
nucleus. Such subpopulations are distinguishable by a number of criteria, including the set
of genes they express, their morphology, and most importantly their connectivity and
electrophysiological properties whereby they subserve particular functions in processing
fear. Current investigations of this issue use optogenetics to address this issue. In this
technique, light-activated ion channels are expressed in specific neuronal subpopulations
through their coupling to a promotor specific to that subtype (alternatively, one can also
engineer ion channels gated by exogenous drugs that can then be administered
experimentally). This is achieved best in transgenic mice, although it also possible to do it
through focal injection of viruses, opening the door to such manipulations in monkeys as
well. Optogenetic studies have demonstrated a tightly regulated network of inhibitory
interneurons within the central nucleus that controls how sensory input (coming into the
basolateral amygdala) can influence outputs to structures such as the hypothalamus and
periaqueductal gray (e.g., [35, 36]). This level of grain is impossible to investigate in
humans so far, and poses a major challenge for how to interpret results from functional
neuroimaging studies, which pool changes in blood-oxygenation-related activation over
voxels several millimeters in size (typically, 15–20 cubic millimeters) over a timecourse of a
few seconds.
As with midbrain and brainstem structures, the amygdala’s role in fear processing is highly
conserved across species ranging from humans [55], to monkeys [56, 57], rodents [58, 59],
and even reptiles [60], mirroring its conserved pattern of connectivity [61]. Sorely needed
are systematic comparative studies that focus on specific structures and networks, and that
map out the similarities and differences in functional components. For instance, the role of
the amygdala in associative learning of fear appears to be ubiquitous across species; the set
of unconditioned stimuli that it processes vary to some extent; and its role in the conscious
experience of fear has been investigated only in humans [39].
Is Fear Adaptive?
Fear is commonly thought to have adaptive functions in terms of both cognition and
behavioral response. Unlike reflexes and fixed-action patterns, the relationship between
stimuli and behaviors mediated by fear is highly flexible and context-dependent (see
“modulation of fear”, below). Indeed, this flexibility is part of what distinguishes emotions:
they are “decoupled reflexes”, central states more akin to personality traits and dispositions.
One feature that highlights this are the highly diverse yet integrated sets of
psychophysiological, cognitive and behavioral changes that all serve as indices of a central
state of fear (Figure 3).
Yet one of the most prominent behavioral aspects of fear in humans remains of debated
functional significance: facial expressions of fear. There is a vast literature regarding
emotional facial expressions (probably the single most commonly used class of stimulus in
human studies of emotion), with strong claims regarding their cultural universality or
relativity, their biological primacy or social construction. But Darwin himself pointed out
that emotional expressions could very well have evolved without having adaptive functions:
they were, to use his phrase, “serviceable associated habits”, vestiges of behaviors that were
once adaptive [17]. This claim is only partly true, however: it might pertain to such
behaviors as emotional facial expressions, body postures, and alarm calls, but not to all fear
behavior. And even these aspects of fear behavior are certainly adaptive. Their main
functions have simply changed, and now they play a primary role in social communication
rather than direct protection and defense [62–64]. There also are still residual adaptive
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functions of many of these expressive behaviors, which give us some insight into how they
likely evolved. For instance, the wide eyes and flared nostrils typically associated with facial
expressions of fear not only communicate fear to other viewers, but in fact alter sensory
perception by increasing the eccentricity in the visual field of stimuli that can be detected,
and increasing airflow through the nose so as to better detect olfactory cues [65].
The Modulation of Fear
A key current challenge is to assemble our knowledge at the level of individual structures,
nuclei, and neuronal populations, to knowledge at the level of distributed large-scale
networks (a challenge that pervades all of emotional and social neuroscience [66]). An
emerging theme from such network concepts is that there are structures more concerned
with directly orchestrating fear-related responses (e.g., PAG and hypothalamus), and
structures more concerned with context-dependent modulation. Of particular interest for the
latter have been prefrontal cortices, which some schemes have partitioned into orbital and
medial networks, subserving processing of emotionally salient sensory stimuli and
orchestrating of visceral emotional responses, respectively [67]; and into ventromedial and
dorsolateral networks related to reward processing and cognitive control [68]. Moreover,
such networks can be related to specific neurotransmitters and levels of action for
pharmacological intervention [69]. The amygdala plays a key role in mediating between
brainstem and cortical levels, with specific nuclei participating in distinct networks that may
be similar across species [61]. Dissecting these networks and understanding their
pharmacology, constitutes one of the main research components towards treating phobias
and anxiety disorders [70].
The context-dependency of fear is seen in terms of the eliciting circumstances (e.g., flight
available or not, which will elicit escape vs. freezing; Figure 4a), type of threat (predator,
conspecific, unknown), distance to the threat (and hence time; i.e., predatory imminence
[20]), and time elapsed since a threat was encountered (resulting, in order, in behaviors such
as active defense and flight, risk assessment, inhibition of movement, distancing). All of
these have been described in some detail by ethologists working on fear in nonhuman
animals [71, 72], and emphasize the temporally extended and dynamic nature of a fear state
that we noted earlier. There are many examples that networks within the medial prefrontal
cortex play a key role in the modulation of fear-related processing, by projecting to targets
such as the amygdala, hypothalamus, and brainstem. For instance, prefrontal regions are
implicated in the extinction of conditioned fear responses, and lesions to ventromedial
sectors of the prefrontal cortex in humans may actually exert a protective role in the
acquisition of disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder [73].
Another example implicating the prefrontal cortex comes from studies of threat imminence:
proximal predator threats require immediate flight; anticipations of dangerous future
situations require long-term planning and control [20, 74] (cf. below). These distinctions are
mirrored in the neural structures that have been emphasized: brainstem and midbrain
structures on the one hand, and forebrain, in particular prefrontal cortex, on the other [27,
58]. Yet a strict dichotomy is probably inaccurate, and a better model may be to think of all
“lower” structures as involved in both immediate and delayed responses, with the latter
including more forebrain modulation; it has also become apparent that loops involving
forebrain processing can be remarkably rapid [75].
An interesting line of work that ties together the themes of specific neurotransmitters
(serotonin), prefrontal networks, and particular subtypes of fear comes from analyses of an
animal’s control over a stressor. Uncontrollable stress has long been known to lead to more
severe health consequences, and to specific behavioral adaptations such as “learned
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helplessness”. This behavior depends in part on serotonergic modulation via the dorsal raphe
nucleus, but also requires input to the dorsal raphe from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
to signal that a stressor is uncontrollable [76].
Responses and Stimuli Associated with Fear
There are many behavioral fear responses that can be used by conspecific observers to infer
fear, and several of them have been quantified as behavioral markers of fear by human
investigators (cf. Table 2 for a partial list). These include such laboratory measures as
freezing (immobility), increased startle, and increased heart rate. More species-specific are
alarm calls signaling danger, which are observed in species from monkeys [77] to rats [78]
to birds [79]. Humans are relatively unique in their repertoire of emotional facial
expressions (although chimpanzees, but not monkeys, can make such expressions as well,
even though we generally do not know what they mean). In addition to behavioral responses
and autonomic changes, there are effects of fear on nearly all aspects of cognition, ranging
from attention to memory to judgment and decision-making (Figure 3b). Recent emphasis
on the adaptive nature of emotions has studied how emotional states can influence decision-
making, in particular an animal’s bias towards uncertainty and risk [80]. Systematic effects
of putative fear states on choice behavior have been claimed even in bees [81].
Similarly, we can think of several broad classes of prototypical fear-inducing stimuli [82].
There are those stimuli whose detection parameters have been set by evolution, for instance
visual presentation of snakes or spiders in humans [83], or the odor of a fox for a ground
squirrel. The bed nucleus of the striaterminalis has been implicated in unconditioned fear
responses (freezing behavior) to a specific odor component of fox feces, trimethylthiazoline
[84]. Then there are those stimuli that an organism has learned are dangerous through
experience (or, in some species, social observation), as well as those stimuli that are not
themselves dangerous but have been associated with the above two classes of stimuli and
can thus serve as conditioned warning cues. It is for the first class of stimuli mentioned
above that there are the strongest arguments for “modules” for fear processing: relatively
encapsulated processing streams that are triggered rather rigidly by specific stimuli, over
which we have little control, and that depend on some specialized neural structures [21, 83].
However, most stimuli of which humans are afraid are probably learned socially [85], a
mechanism also ubiquitous in other animals [86]. Learning about a harmful stimulus from
another animal involves the amygdala, in both rats [87] and humans [88].
An interesting aspect of fear-associated behaviors are those actions taken not proactively but
in order to terminate the state of fear itself: just as the anticipation of fear motivates
behavior, so too does anticipation of its end. Cues associated with the cessation of fear can
reinforce certain behaviors [89], suggesting a broader perspective in how fear behaviors
unfold in time. Rather than thinking of a fear state as a static functional state, or as a fixed
sequence triggered by a fear-inducing stimulus, we should conceive of it as a dynamic
process. The duration of this process would extend from the cues that initiate it through to
the stimuli encountered as it unfolds, the animal’s response, and its own perception of the
interaction between the two, to the final reestablishment of homeostasis. While this makes
things more complicated, it also imposes bounds, since specific structures come into play at
certain points in time.
Distance and Intensity
One of the most prototypical of threat stimuli is an approaching predator (Figure 4). This is a
good example for the functionally specific organization of fear behaviors: animals typically
respond with several distinct packages of adaptive behavior, depending on the distance.
These range from freezing (to avoid being detected) to vocalization (to warn others or
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recruit help), to defensive attack. Such behaviors also show substantial differences between
individuals and species: domestic as well as lab-reared wild rats tend to switch from freezing
to escape when an experimenter is around 1–1.5 meters away, whereas wild trapped rats do
so already at a mean distance of 2.5m [90].
A related stimulus attribute is intensity. Sudden-onset, or high intensity physical properties
of stimuli in many cases elicit fear. To some extent, this can simply reflect the graded
quality of fear cues, and of course intensity is often correlated with distance. Shrinking
interpersonal distance and increasing sound intensity are two examples; in these cases both
are known to activate the amygdala [91, 92]. It has been known for some time that the
different packages of fear behaviors that can be engaged at different distances or intensities
(e.g., freezing versus fleeing) also engage different sets of neural structures [93], the details
of which are now being uncovered. Columnar arrangements of neurons within the
periaqueductal gray play an important role in these different components of fear responses,
with more dorsal regions controlling active escape behaviors, and more ventral regions
controlling inhibition (e.g., freezing) [94]. However, as we noted earlier, there are
substantial ascending projections from the PAG as well, making the functional role of this
brain region considerably more complex than a mere orchestration of emotion-related
output.
Switches from passive to active fear responses (freezing to fleeing) are tightly dependent on
distance from a predator [20, 27], since different behaviors would be adaptive at different
distances (e.g., possibility of evading detection versus need to engage). Neural correlates of
such shifts have been observed in relation to several structures in addition to the PAG. The
central nucleus of the amygdala can orchestrate switches between forebrain arousal and
freezing in mice [34], and shifts from activation in the prefrontal cortex (distal threat) to
PAG (proximal threat) have even been observed in human neuroimaging studies [95]. A
related finding showed that activation in the bed nucleus of the striaterminalis correlated not
with the sheer physical distance of threat (in that study, a tarantula), but with whether it was
approaching or receding [96] (Figure 4). Flexibility and learning in the elicitation of fear
depends on plasticity and inhibitory control within the amygdala [35] as well as both
ascending (e.g., from the PAG) and descending (e.g., from the prefrontal cortex)
modulation. Exactly how an organism integrates sensory information together with its own
coping ability in order to make the choice to switch from freezing to fleeing is a very rich
question in the ecology of decision-making that deserves more study across species.
A major contextual factor in the evaluation of fear-inducing stimuli is whether or not escape
might be possible, or whether the threat seems inescapable, a distinction related to the
modulatory factor of control that we noted earlier. The former is typically associated with
flight, whereas the latter is typically associated with freezing and defense (Figure 4a). This
dimension can require substantial evaluation and amounts to ongoing monitoring and
decision-making. The availability or unavailability of a place for concealment or escape has
also been found to modulate the scenario-elicited fear behaviors of humans, in general quite
in line with what would be predicted based on observations in rodents [2] (cf. Table 3). In
broad terms, this category is related to an animal’s model of its ability to cope with a threat,
an ingredient that has long been highlighted in human psychology by appraisal theories of
emotion [97].
Other Stimulus Attributes
Another quite broad stimulus attribute that elicits fear is unpredictability. This can be a
computationally more complex cue to detect, since it depends on comparisons of stimuli, or
patterns of stimuli, over time. Several commonly used laboratory assays for fear, such as
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open-field tests, neophobia, and measures of latency to emerge from a secure nest, likely tap
this category as well (cf. Table 2); the fear-related behaviors elicited are the complement of
exploration. These fear-inducing attributes are found from mammals through zebrafish [98].
There are various types of unpredictability: temporal uncertainty in the occurrence of a
stimulus, novelty of the stimulus itself, and even the context of knowing that one does not
know much about a given stimulus [99]. One can identify at least two ways in which the
occurrence of a stimulus is uncertain: there is a known probability (<1) associated with its
presentation, an attribute economists refer to as “risk”, or there is uncertainty even about this
probability (one does not know how risky it is), referred to as “ambiguity”. All of these
aspects of unpredictability have been shown to activate the amygdala [100, 101], and
typically include a constellation of behaviors referred to as “risk assessment” that involve
cautious sampling of the environment in order to obtain more information and reduce
unpredictability.
An important category of fear-inducing stimuli are social. Animals can show strong fear
behaviors in response to aggressive or dominant conspecifics. One common model of mood
disorders in rodents is social defeat, a set of long-lasting submission-related behaviors
induced by the inability to defend cage territory against the intrusion of an aggressive and
dominant male. This social stimulus reliably elicits neuronal, endocrine, and immune
changes indicative of anxiety, although longer-term effects are more akin to phenomena
such as learned helplessness and depression [102]. Similar types of responses are found in
other species ranging from zebrafish to humans. A specific category of fear arises when
infant mammals are separated from their mother, a form of immediate separation anxiety
connected with high-frequency (in many mammals, ultrasonic) distress vocalizations of the
young; some theories have termed this type of fear “panic” to distinguish this system from
other fear systems [12] (see also Box 3) and it can be modulated by specific genes as noted
earlier [22]. In humans, social aspects of fear can be elicited by cues such as untrustworthy
faces or invasion of personal space, all stimuli that reliably involve the amygdala [91, 103,
104].
Animals can also show fear in response to subtle cues picked up from the fear induced in
another conspecific; these can be innate (e.g., chicks respond to alarm calls), an example of
social learning (e.g., infant monkeys can learn from fear behaviors of adults [105]), or
involve unknown social signals (e.g., rats placed in contact with other rats who experienced
electric shock show amygdala activation [87]). Somewhat the flip side of increasing sound
intensity that we noted above, sudden cessation of background sounds can be a social signal
of fear in rodents as well [106]. In zebrafish, injured fish release a chemical that functions as
an alarm signal: when detected by other fish, it causes a graded increase in fast swimming
behavior [107]. Social communication of fear is even seen in crickets (in response to
spiders) [108]. Another good example from invertebrates is the emission of carbon dioxide
by Drosophila when flies encounter an innate fear-evoking stimulus such as electric shock.
This odor can evoke avoidance behaviors in other flies, thus serving as a social signal, and is
processed by a highly specific neural circuit [109]. A class of social stimuli that commonly
induces anxiety and is likely unique to humans is public evaluation, such as when one is
forced to give a public speech; this potent scenario is in fact used experimentally to induce
anxiety (e.g., the Trier Social Stress Test).
One intriguing class of stimuli that can trigger states of panic are interoceptive signals. In
particular, signals related to suffocation and panting are known to be represented in the
periaqueductal gray [110] and the amygdala. There is a specific pH-sensitive ion channel
expressed on neurons within the amygdala that may directly sense acidosis due to rising
carbon dioxide levels [111]. Other examples would include strong interoceptive signals of
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major homeostatic imbalance, or organ failure (e.g., a heart attack, or a stroke). It remains
relatively unclear to what extent direct interoceptive signals about such events can be used
to trigger fear, and to what extent fear is instead triggered more derivatively by secondary
consequences and background knowledge (at least in humans).
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that humans stand out from other animals in having fear and
anxiety triggered not by occurrent stimuli, but merely by thinking about such stimuli. The
bulk of psychopathology arises from worrying about what could happen and what might be,
often to the point of distorting what actually is. This aspect of fear induction in humans
probably also contributes to the impression we have that fear depends very much on
conscious experience.
Conscious Experience of Fear
Clearly, different instances of fear and anxiety do all feel similar, and we categorize and
verbally describe them as similar. This fact must be reflected both in psychology and
neurobiology. At the psychological level, two sets of theories have attempted to incorporate
the diversity of stimuli, situations, and behaviors related to fear, on the one hand, with their
apparent psychological and subjective unity, on the other. The first such theory is appraisal
theory, a theory about the adaptive functional role which fear is thought to accomplish.
Older theories that had lists of functional evaluations [97] have been advanced with more
recent accounts that relate specific stimulus evaluation checks to specific points in a
processing sequence [112]. The second psychological theory is the conceptual act theory [6,
14, 113]. According to this constructivist framework, our experience of fear, and certainly
our reports of having fear (and any other emotion), are a highly cognitive synthesis. The
synthesis begins with an initial core affective state (that is perhaps no more finely
differentiated than along dimensions of arousal and valence [4], two dimensions frequently
thought to capture much of the variance across emotions [16]) and then incorporates not
only interoceptive and somatic knowledge of the state of one’s body and of one’s actions,
but also of the context-dependent situation, knowledge stored in memory, and much explicit
information stored in language and acquired in a particular culture. Emotion categories such
as fear are then seen as highly constructed, rather than as biological primitives (cf. Box 1). A
major challenge for future work will be to elucidate the neural substrates of these
psychological components, and to probe whether anything similar can be found perhaps in
nonhuman primates or whether this aspect of fear is unique to humans.
While this review advocates a broadly comparative and functional approach to fear, there is
no reason to exclude the conscious experience of fear. Instead, it seems timely to incorporate
modern theories of consciousness into the study of emotion, including the study of fear in
nonhuman and hence nonverbal animals [12, 114]. There are several advantages to doing so.
First and foremost, it would seem compelling to try to incorporate what laypeople find the
most salient component of a state of fear. We already know that healthy humans feel fear,
that such feelings are the main basis for complaint in psychiatric anxiety disorders, and that
they are abolished by lesions of the amygdala [39]. It is a perfectly respectable scientific
question now to ask whether monkeys, rats, reptiles or flies have feelings of fear, although it
requires some dissection of components of feeling fear (Box 2). Of course, we could not
approach this question in the same way that we typically do in humans (by using language
and asking). Instead, we would need to use other measures that all require some
neurobiological theory of consciousness. But something like this has already been done for
other types of conscious content: for instance, patients who cannot answer any questions,
and who cannot respond behaviorally in any way, show brain activation in response to
verbal instructions that is very similar to the activation seen in healthy, conscious people (in
that study, instruction to imagine playing tennis activated brain regions normally associated
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with such mental imagery, for instance [115]). This allowed the authors of that study to infer
that the patients were conscious, in the absence of any behavioral measure. Extending such
an approach to nonhuman species requires a broader theory of consciousness, but the basic
idea is no different in principle. There are in fact several modern theories of consciousness
that are functionally congenial to understanding the conscious experience of fear, and that
offer testable neurobiological hypotheses.
Three such theories are focused, respectively, on the information-conveying nature of
conscious experiences [116, 117] (integrated information theory), on their ubiquitous
functional consequences [118] (global workspace theory), and on their subjectivity [23, 24,
119] (theories of subjectivity and the self). The reader is referred to the original references
for further description of these theories, but each of them makes neurobiological predictions.
Briefly, these theories could relate to our investigation of fear as follows.
The integrated information theory proposes that a specific conscious experience conveys a
very high amount of information, since it is distinct from so many other experiences and yet
typically integrates very many component attributes [116, 117]. Thus, all the different
shades of feeling fear should correspond to informationally distinct, yet richly integrated,
brain states at the neuronal level. This would put an upper bound on the number of distinct
fear experiences (or emotion experiences more generally) that any organism could
experience, deriving from the complexity of the neural systems instantiating fear.
Presumably, the addition of further cortical territory into the representation of fear in
humans allows for much more nuanced and elaborate experiences of fear [14]. There are
some efforts underway to estimate integrated information in the brain (a very difficult
problem) from measures such as EEG.
With respect to the second popular theory, global workspace theory, a conscious state of fear
has access to a vast number of other cognitive and behavioral processes [118], with the
result that fear modulates attention, memory, perception, and decision-making. The theory
often appeals to nuclei in the thalamus that have the requisite wide connectivity, but the
connectivity of the amygdala could also support such a network in the case of fear [48, 120],
and may explain why focal lesions to this structure can abolish the ability to feel fear, at
least in humans [39].
Finally, harking back to William James’ original insight [7], the content of our conscious
experience of fear includes interoceptive information about the state of our body and mind,
and requires some degree of self-representation [23, 24, 119]. The subjectivity of feeling
afraid requires not only a subject to experience the fear, but also to a good extent specifies
why fear feels the way that it does, at the same time providing the organism with
information about its homeostatic state, its state of preparedness to cope with an
environmental challenge, and motivating it to engage in instrumental behavior. These
components have been hypothesized to depend on regions of the brain that map
interoceptive information, such as the insula and anterior cingulate cortex [23, 25]. This
view also makes the strong prediction that species without interoception cannot feel fear -- a
conjecture that remains entirely unexplored. One intriguing possibility is that a readout of
the neuronal representation of fear in interoceptive structures such as the insula might in
principle provide neuroscientists with the same information that it provides to the subject
feeling fear. This could allow a direct link between psychological theories of emotion that
place a premium on our experience of them, on the one hand, and neurobiological substrate,
on the other. In a sense, it would resurrect William James’ original idea, but use the brain’s
representation of the emotion itself rather than attempt to measure all the varied somatic
correlates of the emotion.
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Conclusions and Open Challenges
There is no single brain structure for processing fear, and even a small set of necessary and
sufficient structures has not emerged. One likely reason that it has been difficult to find clear
evidence of a dedicated fear circuit from fMRI studies in humans [10] is that it is now
apparent that rather different emotional behaviors, ranging from defense to aggression to
mating, are controlled by specific populations of neurons that are spatially within the same
structure and hence unresolvable using fMRI (e.g., [35, 121, 122]). Much the same is true of
value encoding in general: neurons within the amygdala encoding positive or negative
reinforcement appear to be closely intermingled, making their visualization with typical
fMRI approaches problematic [123]. Another reason is that fear evoked by different classes
of stimuli (unpredictability, social, predators, etc.) may be processed by partly separable
neural systems [21, 124]. There is better evidence, and more reason to believe a priori, that
extended systems comprised of a network of structures could be identified. Some fMRI
studies have suggested this, and several models have been proposed [12, 27]. Ultimately, we
may need to redraw the boundaries of the component structures, however: networks for
processing fear will consist of specific subpopulations of cells extended across an array of
structures.
How is it that I can tell my cat is afraid? Typically, I figure this out from all evidence
available, which includes the current situation (are there fear-inducing stimuli or context)
and the animal’s behavior. Darwin’s detailed observation of emotional behaviors in babies,
adult humans, dogs, cats, and other animals demonstrated that many behaviors were
remarkably similar across species [125]. Of course, there are also differences between
species, differences between individuals, and things are vastly more complex in humans
than in a mouse. But comparative as well as developmental observations suggest that a
fruitful starting point is to begin with a primitive concept of fear that is shared across
mammals (or even more broadly than that), and then investigate the variations on this theme.
The neurobiological evidence is then one additional piece of evidence, supplementing the
behavioral and situational clues, and allowing us to begin constructing causal links between
these.
In humans, there is of course another component of fear: its conscious experience. A
complete program for the scientific study of fear will need to go hand-in-hand with the
development of neurobiological and functional theories of conscious experience. The
questions are extremely challenging to answer, but they are questions that make sense and
are interesting to try to answer. At what level of phylogeny does the feeling of fear become
incorporated into its neural representation? Why? (what happened in evolution to make it
adaptive to have this added component?). What components of fear constitute the contents
of its conscious experience? Do we have any control over which components of fear we can
become aware of? (can we train ourselves to become more or less aware of feeling fear?)
Three prominent challenges for the future, then, map onto methods, cross-species
comparisons, and investigation of the conscious experience of fear. The first will require the
combination of single-neuron measurements and manipulations at the level of optogenetics
with a much larger field-of-view (ultimately, a whole-brain field-of-view). The second will
require funding and research consortia that investigate fear across a range of different
species, paying close attention to ecologically validity, especially in experiments with
humans. The third will require close interface with people working on consciousness, and
more precise hypotheses regarding the neurobiology of consciousness. All three taken
together may constitute the future science of fear.
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Box 1. The functional state of fear
This review urges a functional concept of fear, defining this emotion in terms of being
caused by particular patterns of threat-related stimuli, and in turn causing particular
patterns of adaptive behaviors to avoid or cope with that threat. This immediately raises
an important question: are we discovering “fear” through objective scientific
investigation, or are we imputing it through our concept of “fear”? In the same way that
studies in physics would not reveal to us a material object category such as “chairs”,
neurobiological studies of fear might not carve out a state of “fear”. Instead, fear, like
chairs, might be a psychologically constructed category (this of course ultimately makes
it no less biological) [6]. The answer to this worry depends on assuming that patterns
seen by scientists, in particular ethologists, are also patterns seen by evolution. Unlike
distinguishing categories such as “table” and “chair”, which are also functional, but
entirely socially constructed, categories such as “fear” and “disgust” correspond to
functional categories that evolution has sculpted. Without this assumption of functional
homology, it becomes impossible to study fear across species. This is also the reason why
it would be nonsensical to assign “fear” (or any other emotion) to an alien species from
another planet (unless we knew a lot about its environment and the mechanisms for
evolution on that planet, and these were sufficiently similar to the case on earth).
Another question concerns how fear would relate to other central states, such as learning
or attention. Just like a state of fear interfaces causally with stimuli and behavior, it is
embedded in a network of causal relationships with other cognitive processes. Are these
other processes partly constitutive of fear? A state of fear is typically constituted (in part)
by motivating the organism to behave in a certain way, modulating memory, and
directing our attention. So, those aspects of motivation, attention and memory, just like
certain aspects of behavior, are part of an adaptive response to a threatening stimulus. As
such, they are constitutive. However, whereas the causal links to stimuli and behavior are
functionally definitional of fear, the links to other central states have a more empirical
flavor to them: we need to do psychology and/or neuroscience to discover them, and we
may not want to tie the state of fear too closely to their necessary causal interaction
because not all animals may have the same psychological or neurobiological architecture.
The functional approach to defining fear as a central state evoked by threatening stimuli
can be criticized as seemingly circular. What is fear? The state evoked by threat. What is
threat? That which causes fear. The reason that our definition of fear is not circular is that
it is anchored not only in stimuli, but in behaviors. Certain sets of stimuli and behaviors
covary; if they did not, we would never be able to attribute fear to other people or
animals, but we can.
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Box 2. Conscious and unconscious fear
There is a large literature investigating the role of consciousness in fear, but it is
heterogeneous in regard to the content of that conscious experience. Some studies have
shown that stimuli that communicate or trigger fear can do so even when perception of
those stimuli is subliminal, at least to some degree, a mechanism that appears to involve
the amygdala (good evidence; [129, 130]). Others have claimed that such nonconscious
fear processing depends on a particular subcortical route of input to the amygdala that
typically bypasses cortex (debated; [75, 131, 132]).
More controversial is the possibility of unawareness of the feeling of fear itself, rather
than just of the eliciting stimuli. However, non-conscious emotions have been proposed
as a possibility based on some psychological experiments [133]. Regardless of the
empirical status of these dissociations, they highlight the different components of an
experience of fear: one can be aware of the eliciting stimuli and circumstances (often the
object towards which the fear is directed behaviorally); one can be conscious of the
bodily changes that accompany fear; one can be conscious of one’s ability to act in
response to and cope with the fear-eliciting situation; one can be conscious of one’s
change in cognition; and one can be conscious of many associated thoughts and
background knowledge related to fear [14]. When people report that they feel afraid, they
could be reporting on their awareness of any number of these components.
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Box 3. Psychopathology of fear
Despite the high inter-individual variability in fear responses, there are consistent
patterns across time within an individual. That is, many aspects of fear and anxiety can
usefully be characterized as traits, in humans as well as other animals [82, 134]. As with
moods in general, there is substantial heritability for trait anxiety, and for anxiety
disorders, although it seems clear that most of the genetic variance is accounted for by
complex polygenic interactions with environmental stressors, rather than by any single
gene [135]. The decoupling between an immediate stimulus trigger and a fear state also
makes trait anxiety prone to dysregulation: anxiety disorders constitute one of the most
common psychiatric illnesses (all in all, close to 20% of the population suffers from an
anxiety disorder of some kind in any given year [136]).
There are clinical distinctions between dysfunctions of fear processing that have some
evidence for involvement of specific brain structures and neurotransmitter systems,
making them candidates for functional subtypes of fear that will be reflected in the brain.
Generalized anxiety disorder features chronic worry about a range of events, typically
focused on the future. Panic disorder, on the other hand, results from a severe and acute
fear response-- often in the absence of an ability to cope, such as the sensation of
suffocation that can be experimentally induced by inhaling carbon dioxide (other
experimental inducers of panic are intravenous administration of lactate or
cholecystokinin). Phobias are characterized both by predictive anxiety as well as acute
flight responses, often to specific classes of stimuli (e.g., spiders or snakes). Ever since
Freud, anxiety disorders have been viewed as resulting from pathological suppression,
repression or avoidance of fear-eliciting situations, thoughts, and stimuli [137]. The
reasonable hypothesis based on such views is that treatment should emphasize exposure
to fear-inducing stimuli, and access to fear-related thoughts and memories [138, 139],
essentially updating emotional information [140]. The psychological concepts related to
anxiety and its treatment have been mapped onto behavioral processes such as adaptation
and extinction, and onto their neural correlates [141], a thriving corpus of research in
modern neuroscience.
There are alternative possibilities for how pathology might emerge from fear, not
mutually exclusive with the above: it simply might represent an exaggerated fear
reaction. Phobias would be an example. One plausible point in processing for such
exaggeration to exert its effect would be at the earliest stage (a component that itself may
involve learning: discrimination among stimulus properties that evoke conditioned fear
becomes broader after aversive learning [142]). Thus, increased expectation of, and
rumination about fear, can be associated with increased vigilance and attention to
potentially dangerous stimuli [143, 144]. The consequence is a generally heightened state
of arousal, accompanied by many fear-like responses that can be thought of as false
positives from a signal detection perspective. The threshold for detecting fear has simply
been set too low and too many stimuli that have a very low probability of being
dangerous are misinterpreted as dangerous [145]. One might wonder why pathological
anxiety should be so prevalent at all. Is it so hard to set the right threshold? The solution
is to realize the asymmetry between false negatives (which can result in death) and false
positives (which, in isolation, often have few consequences). It is only when false
positives cumulatively begin to impair daily functioning, or when their number increases
as environmental circumstances change, that pathology becomes evident. An example
illustrates the point [146]: You are a hunter-gatherer at a watering hole and hear a noise,
which could be a lion. Suppose the cost of fleeing in panic is 200 calories, and the cost of
engaging a lion is 200,000 calories. Some simple calculations show that you should flee
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in panic if the probability of the noise being a lion is 1/1000 or greater. Which means that
999/1000 times you are panicking with no lion, i.e., you have a false positive.
There is yet another view regarding pathological states of fear: that they arise from the
operation of a module that is relatively impenetrable to control, operates relatively
automatically, and has been tuned by evolution. All these features could render such a
module not only difficult to override, but also responsive to stimuli in a way that would
have been adaptive in our ancestral environment but may no longer be so. This view is
supported by responses to so-called “prepared stimuli”, objects such as snakes and
spiders that are the most common targets of specific phobias and that can be more easily
conditioned (or, indeed, need not be conditioned at all) to produce fear [83]. Another
distinguishing feature of such fear modules typically is the proposal that they can operate,
to some extent, outside conscious awareness of the eliciting stimuli (cf. Box 2).
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Figure 1. Neuroimaging of emotion in humans
(A,B) Examples suggesting that there is no focused neural network for fear, but that
emotions are instead processed in a very distributed fashion. (A) Meta-analysis of activation
in the amygdala. The y-axis plots the proportion of studies surveyed that showed significant
activation within 10mm of the amygdala (inset), broken down in terms of studies looking at
the perception (per) or experience (exp) of particular emotions. (B) Significant activations in
specific brain regions (structures in boxes around the outside of the circle) as a function of
specific processes (blue lines: left hemisphere, green lines: right hemisphere). The
percentage plots from the origin denote the change in odds that an activation would be seen,
from logistic regression of the meta-analysis. Modified from a meta-analysis of 91
neuroimaging studies [126]; see also [11]. Abbreviations: DLPFC=dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; ATL=anterior temporal lobe; VLPFC=ventrolateral prefrontal cortex;
DMPFC=dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; aMCC=anterior middle cingulate cortex;
sACC=subgenual anterior cingulate cortex; OFC=orbitofrontal cortex. (C) Example to the
contrary, suggesting that there is a focused neural network for fear, prominently including
the amygdala. Activation likelihood maps of fear are shown from another meta-analysis of
30 recent neuroimaging studies [8]; here hotter colors represent greater spatial overlap
(consistency) among significant activations across multiple studies in the meta-analysis. The
amygdala is prominently activated across studies of fear.
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Figure 2. The amygdala
(A) Some of the main amygdala nuclei and their inputs and outputs, emphasizing the
complex internal architecture of this structure. (B) Amygdala connectivity with other brain
structures, emphasizing its participation in multiple networks that process fear, and its
central location in mediating between parts of the prefrontal cortex and nuclei in the
hypothalamus and brainstem. Modified from [69] and [120]. Abbreviations: MDm:
dorsomedial thalamus, which mediates between amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex; Ca,
Acc, P, VP: components of the basal ganglia (Caudate, Accumbens, Putamen, Ventral
Pallidum); Ce, AB, B, L: nuclei of the amygdala (Central, Accessory Basal, Basal, Lateral);
EC: entorhinal cortex.
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Figure 3. Functional components of fear: stimuli, cognition, and behavior
(A) Stimuli and behaviors related to fear, schematized in terms of their complexity and the
degree of an organism’s involvement and control (regulation). Fear can be caused by a wide
range of stimuli, from basic unconditioned stimuli to complex symbolic knowledge; and it
can in turn trigger core biological responses as well as be modulated volitionally, at least in
humans. Very roughly, the components at the upper left are shared across a wider range of
species, whereas the components at the bottom right may be unique to humans. (B)
Schematic of some of the effects of a central state of fear on cognition and processing mode.
Fear interfaces with nearly all other aspects of cognition.
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Figure 4. Fear, the amygdala, and distance
Physical distance (proximity) is one of the most basic stimulus cues to trigger fear. (A)
Different adaptive types of fear behaviors can be elicited as a function of distance, ranging
from freezing to fleeing to defensive attack. Adapted from [74], see also [20] for a similar
scheme. (B) Lesions of the human amygdala reduce interpersonal distance and the sense of
invasion of personal space. At the top are schematized the mean interpersonal distances
from an experimenter for healthy controls (left) and a patient with bilateral amygdala lesions
(patient SM, right). At the bottom is a plot of the data showing mean distance that people
felt comfortable standing from the experimenter (at the origin), patient SM is the red bar and
the rest are healthy controls. From [91]. (C) Approach or retreat of a threatening stimulus (a
tarantula) in a human fMRI study showed differential activation of the amygdala and bed
nucleus of the striaterminalis. Participants lay inside the fMRI scanner while their foot was
placed in compartments at varying distances from the tarantula, a procedure they observed
through video (left panel). Subtraction of approach minus retreat (for the same distance,
middle panel) resulted in the activation shown on the right panel. From [96].
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Figure 5. Components of a central fear system
The schematic outlines some of the processing that contributes to fear, including sensory
inputs, central structures, and effectors. From [31].
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Table 1
Emotion theories of fear.
Type of Theory Key Features Reference
Motivation/Personality 5 types of fear: evolutionary danger, novelty, intensity, learning, social [82]
Neurofunctional 2 systems: fear and panic [12]
Adaptive/Evolutionary Fear is an instance of a more basic and broader survival system [13]
Basic Emotion Fear is one of a small set of basic emotions, which are cross-cultural [3, 147]
Modular Phobias (to snakes, spiders, etc.) reflect the operation of modules [83]
Modular Pain, predators, and conspecific aggression are 3 types of fear [21]
Dimensional Fear is one location in a 2-D space of arousal and valence (“core affect”) [4]
Dimensional Fear is one location in a 2-D space of reward and punishment [15]
Social Construct The experience of fear in humans is constructed from core affect [14]
A sampling of some of the commonly encountered frameworks for thinking about fear. For a more general introduction to psychological theories of
emotion, see [127, 128].
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Table 2
Measures of fear in rodents (top) and humans (bottom).
Behavioral Test Measure of Anxiety
open field exploration isolated animal avoids bright open areas and prefers secure nest
elevated plus-maze isolated animal avoids open arms of an elevated maze and prefers closed arms
social interaction test animal in a male pair reduces interaction time with the other animal
hypophagia reduced food intake when anxious (e.g., in novel environments)
burying behavior increased burying of food or other objects
open field emergence less emergence into an open space from a secure nest
enhanced startle increased startle to a loud noise, to conditioned or unconditioned fear stimuli
Psychophysiology/ endocrine Fear Questionnaires
Skin-conductance response (autonomic arousal) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
Potentiation of auditory startle (measures several emotions) Beck Anxiety Inventory
Facial EMG (measures several emotions) Fear Survey Schedule
Heart rate, respiration (measures several emotions, not specific) Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale
Pupillometry (autonomic arousal) Social Avoidance/Distress Scale
Salivary cortisol (long-duration arousal, stress) Anxiety Sensitivity Index
Albany Panic and Phobia Q.
Fear Questionnaire
PANAS-X Fear
The table is only a partial listing of the many behavioral measures that can be used to index fear and anxiety. Whereas the rodent tests are all
behavioral, probes in humans encompass a smaller set of psychophysiological measures and a large set of self-report questionnaires (see [39] for
details on these).
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